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ABSTRACT: In Serbia the inactivity 
rate of the working-age population is close 
to 40%, among the highest in Europe. 
The country also faces a high informal 
employment rate of 24%. Previous research 
has argued that high levels of informality 
and inactivity are mostly due to a high 
effective tax wedge at low wage levels 
caused by a minimum base for calculation 
of social security contributions (SSC), 
sudden withdrawal of means-tested 
benefits once formal income is earned, and 
low progressivity of income tax. This paper 
evaluates the impact of the minimum SSC 
base reform scenarios on labour supply and 
employment formalization using tax and 
benefit micro-simulation models together 
with the structural discrete choice labour 
supply model based on the Survey on Income 
and Living Conditions Data. Although we 
do not find positive employment effects 
of the reform, it would be premature to 
deduce that abolishment of the minimum 
SSC base is not needed. At this stage in our 
research, until alternative labour-supply 
modelling is applied, with both sector and 
hours of work choice alternatives, it is only 
safe to conclude that the proposed reform 
will not significantly contribute to the 
transformation of informal full-time to 
formal full-time jobs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A high labour force participation rate is important for competitiveness, especially 
with an aging population. Moreover, it is important for political and social 
stability. In Serbia the inactivity rate of the working-age population is close 
to 40%, among the highest in Europe. The country also faces a high informal 
employment rate of almost 24%. The size of the active population will be under 
further pressure in the next decade, since its main reservoir, i.e., the working-
age population, is projected to drop cumulatively by around 8 percentage points 
as the baby boomers exit the working-age population (Arandarenko, 2011). In 
this respect, measures aimed at increasing labour force participation need to be 
addressed.
Studies by Arandarenko and Vukojevic (2008) and Koettl (2012) argue that the 
high levels of informality and inactivity in Serbia are mostly due to the design 
of the tax and benefit system. Arandarenko and Vukojevic (2008) were the 
first to calculate, using OECD methodology, the labour tax wedge, defined as 
the difference between labour costs and take-home (net) wage of workers over 
total labour costs, for Western Balkan countries. They show that progressivity of 
the tax wedge for Serbia and countries in the region is very mild or completely 
absent at 50%-100% of average wage levels, which is empirically the most dense 
section of the wage distribution. The authors argue that specific features of the 
region’s tax regimes (social security contribution (SSC) bases and ceilings, no 
progressivity) encourage the dualization of the region’s labour markets into an 
informal, low-wage segment and a formal, higher-wage segment (with large 
public sector representation). Specifically, they point out that by enforcing high 
entry costs (in terms of high minimum mandatory bases for SSC payments and 
modest or entirely missing zero tax brackets for personal income tax), the taxes 
discourage formalization of jobs for low-wage labour. 
This article examines the possible labour supply effect of policy reform that 
includes abolishment of the minimum SSC base. In Randjelovic and Zarkovic-
Rakic (2013), using a tax and benefit micro-simulation model for Serbia (SRMOD), 
we calculated change in effective average tax rates (EATR) and effective marginal 
tax rates (EMTR) across deciles of income distribution as a result of the same 
reform1. Simulation results indicated that abolishment of the minimum SSC base 
1 Effective marginal tax rate shows at which rate additional income is taxed, whereas effective 
averaget ax rate shows the proportion of total taxes (including social security contributions) 
to market (gross) income.
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would reduce both EMTRs and EATRs, with larger effect at the extensive margin 
(labour force participation response) than at the intensive margin (hours of 
work response). As expected, a decrease in both tax rates was most pronounced 
for lower income groups, given that they are most affected by the minimum 
contribution base. Using EATR and EMTR, however, it is only possible to show 
indirect disincentive effects coming from a policy reform. In order to evaluate 
true behavioural responses the micro-simulation model needs to be linked to 
the discrete choice labour supply model, a variant of which is used in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. After this short introduction, the next section 
describes how the minimum SSC base provides disincentives to formal work and 
labour market participation, particularly among individuals with low earning 
capacity. The third section provides insight into methodology and data, while the 
fourth section discusses the main results. The last section concludes with several 
policy recommendations.
2.  MINIMUM SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS BASE:  
MAKING WORK NOT PAY AT LOW WAGE LEVELS?
Social security contribution systems in the Western Balkan region are 
characterised by the existence of mandatory minimum bases for social security 
contribution payments. In some countries, such as Macedonia, the minimum SSC 
base offers a future safety net for workers in terms of pensions and ensures some 
minimum contribution to social funds, given that there is no national minimum 
wage in the country. In Serbia between 2001 and 2004 there were education-
differentiated minimum mandatory bases. For some groups (e.g., those with a 
college or university degree) the minimum SSC base was higher than the average 
wage. The uniform minimum SSC base was introduced in 2004. At that time the 
minimum SSC base was set at 40% of the average gross wage, and in 2007 it was 
reduced to 35% of the average gross wage. When the gross minimum wage for 
full time employment is lower than the minimum base for SSC, the minimum 
base is used for the calculation of income tax and social security contributions. 
In Serbia there is also a minimum wage, introduced by the 2014 Labour Law. Its 
net amount per working hour is set semi-annually by the Socioeconomic council 
- the tripartite government body that includes representatives of the government, 
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the labour unions, and employers’ associations.2 Through almost the entire 
period of 2005-2014,thegross minimum wage for full time employment was 
higher than the minimum SSC base (except in 2006). This means that full-time 
minimum-wage workers should not be affected by the minimum SSC base (see 
Table 1). Due to weak enforcement mechanisms, however, in practice a certain 
number of full-time workers also get lower wages than the minimum wage, thus 
also being potentially affected by the minimum SSC base provision. Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions (SILC) data for 2013, used in this paper, shows 
that 5.5 % of formally employed persons receive less than the minimum wage 
(27.000 dinars gross in 2013). However, the minimum SSC base is only binding 
for those receiving less than the minimum base amount (around 21.000 dinars), 
and only 0.8% of formally employed workers belong to this group3. 
Table 1. Minimum SSC base and minimum wage, 2005-2014
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Gross 
minimum 
wage
10,156 11,524 13,904 17,416 20,578 21,305 23,198 26,399 27,043 26,941 
Minimum 
SSC base 9,473 11,806 12,879 15,217 15,797 16,166 17,806 19,459 20,884 21,246 
Source: Author’s calculation. Note: Both indicators present the average value in a given year, 
assuming 174 working hours per month
Since 2002 the informal sector in Serbia has been increasingly absorbing 
unqualified and unskilled workers (Krstić and Sanfey 2011). Latest data from the 
Labour Force Survey show that almost 50% of all informally employed individuals 
have primary educational level at the highest (LFS 2015). However, low-educated 
individuals are the majority not only among the informally employed but 
also among the inactive. SILC data shows that inactivity rates for those with 
primary education are significantly higher than for those with secondary and 
tertiary education. At the same time, women with low education attainment are 
in a particularly difficult labour market position. On average, they have a 26.8 
percentage point higher inactivity rate than men. The lack of working experience 
2 According to amendments to the Labour Law, adopted in July 2014, the minimum wage is 
to be determined by the Socioeconomic Council once a year (by 15 September of the current 
year for the next year).
3 Individuals are considered to be in the informal sector if they work in an unregistered firm, 
or in a registered business but are not paying social security contributions. Unpaid family 
workers are also included in the group of informally employed persons. All other workers are 
considered to be formally employed.
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is an additional contributing factor to high unemployment and inactivity rates, 
and again especially for women. For instance, 44% of women among those who 
are inactive and with primary education have no working experience
Low-education attainment coupled with lack of work experience generates low 
earnings capacity in the labour market. When earnings or potential earnings 
are low, incentives to seek employment or stay in formal employment are usually 
limited. For these individuals, incentive problems are further aggravated by a 
high tax burden on labour income due to the minimum SSC base, and by a sudden 
withdrawal of major social benefits once a person has any formal income on his/
her record. This has been shown in Koettl’s (2012) study using the Implicit Costs 
of Formalization (ICF) indicator. ICF measures the difference between informal 
income (informal wage and social assistance at the level of no formal wage) and 
formal net income (formal net wage and social assistance at formal wage) as a 
share of informal income. It is therefore the share of informal income that an 
informal worker has to give up in order to formalize. Koettle (2012) shows that in 
Serbia the ICF is high at lower wage levels. A single person with no children who 
earns less than the minimum wage in the informal sector has to give up between 
40% and 75% of income to formalize. A one-earner couple with two children has 
to give up between 20% and 40% of informal income at very low wage levels, and 
between 40% and 55% of informal income at wage levels between 10% and 100% 
of the average wage.
Since a minimum SSC base is one of the factors of high ICF (for low–income 
and/or part-time earners), its reform is one of the policy options that may help to 
formalize informal employees and activate the inactive. When a minimum SSC 
base applies, the following formula is used for gross-to-net conversion:
gross wage =
net wage – 1.100 + 0.199 * 21200
0.9
where 0.199 is the rate of SSC on the part of employees, 21.200 is the minimum 
SSC base, and 1.100 is the non-taxable threshold. If there is no minimum SSC 
base the formula becomes: 
gross wage =
net wage – 1.100
0.701
For example, if someone is working half-time at the minimum wage level, the 
wage he/she receives in gross terms is 14.000 dinars. That corresponds to 9.482 
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dinars in the net amount. After the abolishment of the minimum SSC base, the 
net wage increases to 10.900 dinars. Using the methodology explained in the next 
section, we aim to estimate the impact of this increase in net wage on labour force 
participation and formalization.
3. METHODOLOGY
In order to analyse labour supply and the fiscal effects of policy reform scenarios, 
we combine the tax-benefit micro-simulation model for Serbia (SRMOD) 
with a structural discrete-choice labour-supply model. The tax and benefit 
microsimulation model allows us to reproduce the budget constraint for each 
household, i.e., the latent set of working hours and household disposable income 
alternatives, while the labour supply model rationalizes observed behaviour.
The tax and benefit micro-simulation model for Serbia, SRMOD, is based on the 
EUROMOD platform, EUROMOD being the tax and benefit micro-simulation 
model for the European Union (Randjelovic and Zarković-Rakic 2013). Similar 
to other micro-simulation models, SRMOD is a tax and benefit calculator based 
on micro-data on income, earnings, and labour force participation, as well as 
on various socio-demographic features. SRMOD currently uses data disclosed in 
the Survey on Income and Living Conditions, collected for the first time in 2013 
by the Statistical Office on are presentative sample of 6,501 households (20,069 
individuals), stratified in two levels: enumeration districts as primary and 
households as secondary selection units. The SILC database contains detailed 
information on household and individual income, labour market status, and 
socio-economic features. Use of SILC data and the tax-benefit rules programmed 
in SRMOD enables computation of taxes and main means-tested benefits for each 
individual and household. Starting from the (gross) income data and simulated 
values of taxes and benefits, the main output of the model is disposable income 
for an individual/household. 
When policy reform is introduced in SRMOD, the model shows the direct (‘day 
after’) effect of a reform on the change in disposable income for each individual/
household. This change is expected to trigger labour participation (both at the 
intensive and the extensive margins), thus producing an additional impact on 
households’ disposable income. These second-round effects are estimated using a 
structural labour supply model with discrete labour choice.
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The labour supply model is based on the assumption that a person can choose 
from a finite number of working hours, depending on her/his income-leisure 
preferences (Van Soest 1995).Here we use an extension of the discrete choice 
labour supply model, the so called ‘switching’ model proposed by De Hoyos 
(2012); Bucheli and Ceni (2010); Marcouiller et al. (1997), and Saavedra and 
Chong (1999). It is based on the assumption that instead of choosing working 
hours, a person can choose between three ‘sectors’: inactivity, informal work, and 
formal work, and thus earn zero, an informal wage, or a formal wage, respectively. 
A person’s choice of sector depends on his/her wages, other household income 
(partner’s earnings, pension, social benefits, etc.) and individual and household 
characteristics (e.g., level of education, number of children, etc.). More formally, 
the person in the switching model maximizes the utility function:
Vji = αi ∙ DI(wiSj,Zi) + bi + ci + vji, j = 0, inf, for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Vhi is a total utility that is the sum of the deterministic αi ∙ DI(wiSj,Zi) + bi + ci 
and the stochastic part (vji)
4. Within the deterministic part of the utility function, 
DI(wiSj,Zi) is a household disposable income, calculated by SRMOD based on the 
person’s choice of ‘sector’ (Sj), the wage he/she earns in this sector5 (wji), and 
other household characteristics and income (Zi). Parameter ai represents income 
preferences, while bi and ci are the observed preferences for working in the 
informal and formal sector respectively6. Both parameters bi and ci are expected 
to be negative, since not working is preferable to working in either of the sectors. 
Preferences are heterogeneous, in the sense that they vary with individual and 
household characteristics (e.g., level of education, number of children, etc.). 
For the inactive and unemployed, we predict the monthly wages that they 
would earn in formal and informal employment. For the informally employed 
we predict wages that they would earn in the case of formal employment, and 
vice versa for the formally employed. The predictions are based on their human 
capital characteristics and separate wage estimates for formal and informal 
4 The stochastic part of the utility function is the i.i.d. error term for each choice, which 
represents observational and optimization errors as well as transitory situations (Bargain 
2012).
5 The wage for the inactivity ‘sector’ is set to zero. 
6 More formal operationalization of the model includes another parameter for the inactivity 
‘sector’. However, for identification purposes this parameter is set to zero, so that the 
parameters bi and ci are interpreted compared to this option.
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employment (using the three-stage Heckman-type model7). Using SRMOD, we 
calculate the disposable income for each individual and each of the three choices 
and estimate preference parameters and the probability of each of the choices. 
Finally, we estimate the labour supply and the ‘switching’ (from informal to formal 
employment, or vice versa) effects of the reform by comparing the predicted 
probabilities of the choices under pre-reform (current tax-benefit system) and 
post-reform conditions (after the SSC reform).
As a standard practice, a sample for the labour supply model is constructed after 
dropping from the database those under 18 and over 64 years of age, students, 
pensioners, persons with disability, and women on maternity leave. This is 
because their labour supply is inflexible. Additionally, we drop those who are 
self-employed and unpaid family members. This is a standard practice in labour 
supply modelling, given that it is reasonable to assume that for employees 
in the sample the employment decision and the number of hours worked per 
week are the channels through which they respond to tax reforms, while for the 
self-employed hours of work and employment are not the important margin of 
response. Therefore, their labour supply behaviour may indeed be rather different 
from that of salaried workers and would require a different modelling strategy. 
This also means that the sample for the informally employed includes only those 
in wage employment.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Wage Equation, Utility Function, and Labour Supply Elasticities 
The estimated coefficients of the Heckman wage and selection equations for 
the switching model are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. The 
coefficients have the expected signs and magnitudes. For both men and women 
wages rise with years of education and work experience and with the probability 
of living in an urban area.
The participation and informal sector selection biases are present for both 
men and women. This means that selection into employment and informal 
employment is not random, but rather depends on factors such as education, 
number of children, marital status, region, etc. Looking at the selection equations 
7 The three-stage model includes: (1) estimation of the participation choice equation, (2) 
estimation of the sector (formal/informal) choice equation, and (3) estimation of the formal 
and informal wage equation.
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in both Table A1 and Table A2, we can find out more about the characteristics 
of individuals choosing the informal rather than the formal sector of economic 
activity. We observe that being married increases the probability of working 
in the formal sector. Our results also indicate that having children reduces the 
probability of women working formally, while in the case of men the results 
are the opposite. This may be due to the greater flexibility of informal working 
arrangements, which allow women to carry out informal work together with 
childcare and home work. Also, choosing the informal sector might be a way for 
women to avoid the childcare costs associated with formal employment. On the 
other hand, men’s formal employment might represent the way to provide health 
care insurance for the whole family, which could be regarded as an incentive for 
men to opt for formal work
The parameter estimates for the utility functions are shown in Table 2. The 
marginal utility of income is positive, and the marginal utilities of working in 
the formal and informal sectors (compared to inactivity) are negative; i.e., not 
working is preferable to working in either of the sectors. Furthermore, the size 
of the parameter for the informal sector is higher than for the formal sector, 
indicating that the dis utility of working in the informal sector is higher than 
the dis utility of working in the formal sector. In other words, higher wages in 
the formal sector are not sufficient to explain the decision to work in the formal 
rather than the informal sector. The informal sector therefore has an additional 
‘cost’ of working compared to the formal sector8.
8 The explanation of these costs is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this result is 
plausible in the context of the labour market situation in Serbia, given that informal workers 
face a high level of job insecurity, are not covered by the social security system (health 
insurance, pension, etc.), and generally face poorer working conditions.
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Table 2: Switching model - conditional logit estimates
 Basic model
Model with 
heterogeneous 
preferences
VARIABLES coef Se Coef se
HH disposable income 1.095*** (0.038) 0.733*** (0.135)
HH disposable income squared -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001)
x Age 0.007** (0.003)
x Married 0.192*** (0.068)
x Children 0.230*** (0.082)
Formal employment -2.991*** (0.096) -1.376*** (0.367)
x Age -0.043*** (0.009)
x Married 0.194 (0.200)
x Children -0.719*** (0.228)
Informal employment -4.811*** (0.106) -2.151*** (0.383)
x Age -0.060*** (0.009)
x Married -0.301 (0.221)
x Children -1.237*** (0.294)
Observations 23,448 23,448
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.34
Log likelihood -5837  -5682  
Source: Authors’ calculation. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Starting from the estimated utility functions, we have calculated participation 
elasticity and informal employment elasticity (Table 3). Elasticities are obtained 
by increasing the formal gross hourly wages by 1% under the pre-reform tax-
benefit system, simulating the changes in the participation rate and the informal 
employment rate. 
Table 3: Participation and informal employment elasticities
Elasticities Basic model Model with heterogeneous preferences
Participation 1.145% 1.167%
Informal employment 0.274% 0.274%
Source: Authors’ calculation
The participation elasticity is positive, meaning that a wage increase would raise 
the participation of those that are currently inactive or unemployed. Bargain et al. 
(2011) provide comprehensive cross-country (17 European countries and the US) 
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comparison of labour supply elasticities. They find large variation in elasticities 
across the countries, the higher estimates being reported in countries with lower 
labour market participation (e.g., Italy). Estimated labour supply elasticities in 
Serbia are closer to the results for Southern Europe, that is, countries with lower 
participation rates. This is also in line with the review of labour supply elasticities 
reported in Meghir and Phillips (2010).
Informal employment elasticity from the switching model is positive but 
significantly lower than the participation elasticity, indicating that an increase of 
wages in the formal economy (with constant effects for the informal economy) 
would make only some informal workers ‘switch’ from the informal to the formal 
sector.
4.2 Participation and Formalization Effects of Policy Reform
In order to better understand the labour market effects of the reforms, it is 
important to first present the static or so-called ‘day after’ effects of the reforms 
before behavioural responses are taken into account. According to the results 
presented in Table 4, quite a small number of the currently employed are affected 
by the abolishment of the minimum SSC base. As already explained, in SILC data 
only 0.8% of formally employed individuals receive a gross wage that is lower 
than the minimum SSC base amount, and for whom thus the minimum base 
is binding. The effect of the reform, in terms of its impact on the increase of 
disposable income per individual, is around RSD 800 on average, thus very low.9
Table 4. Static effects of the reform
Reform 
Number of 
individuals 
affected
Average increase in 
disposable income 
per individual
Budgetary 
effects
Minimum contribution base 
(individuals) 13,251 759 21,056,464
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
If the government decides to abolish the minimum social security contributions 
base it would reduce budgetary revenues, coming from contributions levied on 
both employers and employees, by a monthly amount of RSD 21 million. On a 
9 With a median value of around RSD 950, the minimum being 137 dinars and the maximum 
increase in disposable income being 2,163 dinars.
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yearly basis this would reduce government revenues by 0.08% of GDP, or 250 
million dinars.
A transition matrix presented in Table 5 shows that participation and 
formalization effects due to minimum contributions reform are non-existent. 
Increase in disposable income after the reform is not high enough to make people 
transit from inactivity to the labour market and from the informal to the formal 
employment sector. Effects are also missing for those at the bottom of the income 
distribution who would be most affected by the reform.
Table 5. Labour supply response of SSC minimum-base reform: transition matrix
All
Post-reform 
choice
Non-
participation
Formal 
employment
Informal 
employment
Pre-
reform 
choice
Non-
participation 1,230,278 15 0
Formal 
employment 0 1,479,514 0
Informal 
employment 0 0 149,577
First quintile
Pre-
reform 
choice
Non-
participation 552,442 15 0
Formal 
employment 0 29,323 0
Informal 
employment 0 3 18,090
Source: Authors’ calculation
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Serbia is a country with a troubled labour market situation. The unemployment 
rate is high and the inactivity rate even higher. Inactivity is widespread among 
women and increases for individuals with low educational attainment. The lack 
of working experience is an additional contributing factor to high unemployment 
and inactivity rates, again especially for women. Additionally, work in the 
informal sector is prevalent, particularly among individuals with low earning 
capacity
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The implicit costs of formalization in Serbia are relatively high at low wage levels 
due to the rule for calculation of the minimum SSC base, withdrawal of means 
tested benefits once formal income is earned, and low progressivity of the income 
tax scheme. The universal minimum SSC base (set at the 35% of the average 
wage) particularly affects individuals with low earning capacity. This paper 
assesses labour supply effects of the abolishment of the minimum contributions 
base using a tax and benefit micro-simulation model together with a structural 
discrete labour supply model. 
The results show that reform would not bring any positive effects in labour market 
participation and formalization even for the people at the bottom of the income 
distribution who are most affected by the existence of the minimum SSC base. 
Government would lose some RSD 250 million (0.08% of GDP) of public revenue. 
However, given the limitations of our current modelling approach, for the 
moment it is only safe to conclude that the proposed reform will not significantly 
contribute to the transformation of informal full-time to formal full-time work. 
Our model does not introduce hours of work into the decision to join formal or 
informal labour market activity. Given that the proposal to abolish the minimum 
SSC base aims to target those wishing to work part-time, in order to evaluate the 
full impact of the reform the next step should be to develop a more advanced 
model that integrates both choice of hours and sectors. This could produce 
different results from those obtained in this paper. 
One final word of caution. A key hypothesis of this type of model is perfect 
elasticity of labour demand. In a labour market were unemployment is severe, like 
that in Serbia, it is unlikely that this hypothesis will hold. It is then necessary to 
take into account unemployment in the model to estimate unbiased parameters. 
Ideally, it would be necessary to evaluate elasticity of labour demand to predict 
accurately the effect of a policy reform. This cannot be done with the type of 
household data that we have, but would require firm-level data. This all presents 
an interesting avenue for future research.
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Heckman wage equation, switching model (formal income)
men women
EQUATION VARIABLES coef se coef se
lny Years of highest education 0.051*** (0.006) 0.070*** (0.008)
Secondary education (1-3 years)1 -0.032 (0.021) -0.092*** (0.026)
Tertiary education (4 years)1 0.227*** (0.035) 0.257*** (0.037)
Work experience 0.006*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.001)
Settlement (urban=1) 0.052*** (0.017) 0.079*** (0.018)
Vojvodina2 -0.076*** (0.024) -0.050** (0.022)
West Serbia2 -0.122*** (0.024) -0.107*** (0.021)
South-East Serbia2 -0.148*** (0.025) -0.155*** (0.024)
Constant 9.771*** (0.073) 9.246*** (0.092)
select Years of highest education 0.146*** (0.010) 0.176*** (0.009)
non-
participation Age 0.178*** (0.014) 0.196*** (0.016)
Age squared -0.002*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000)
Settlement (urban=1) -0.289*** (0.049) 0.123** (0.048)
Regional unemployment rate (%) -0.005 (0.010) -0.025*** (0.010)
Number of children below 1 year 0.189* (0.103) -0.648*** (0.116)
Number of children -0.009 (0.027) -0.106*** (0.028)
Marital status (2 categories) 0.552*** (0.058) 0.070 (0.052)
Pensions (ad_eq, 000) -0.010*** (0.003) -0.005 (0.003)
Benefits (ad_eq, 000) -0.027** (0.013) -0.018** (0.008)
Constant -4.576*** (0.364) -5.304*** (0.384)
Athrho -0.258*** (0.064) -0.088 (0.160)
lnsigma -0.965*** (0.021) -1.086*** (0.026)
Observations 3,532 3,882
Censored N 1,380 2,052
rho -0.25 -0.088
LR test ofindep. eqns. (rho = 0): 16.1 0.30
 Prob> chi2: 0.000061  0.58  
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men women
EQUATION VARIABLES coef se coef se
select Years of highest education 0.138*** (0.016) 0.154*** (0.021)
informal Age 0.013*** (0.004) 0.015*** (0.004)
Number of children below 1 year -0.089 (0.145) 0.604 (0.529)
Number of children 0.056 (0.045) -0.036 (0.058)
Marital status (2 categories) 0.328*** (0.093) 0.262*** (0.088)
Pensions (ad_eq, 000) 0.012** (0.006) 0.003 (0.007)
Benefits (ad_eq, 000) -0.011 (0.008) 0.002 (0.010)
Constant -1.085*** (0.238) -1.193*** (0.303)
athrho -0.184** (0.086) 0.939*** (0.141)
lnsigma -0.975*** (0.020) -1.027*** (0.030)
Observations 2,404 1,980
Censored N 252 150
rho -0.18 0.73
LR test ofindep. eqns. (rho = 0): 4.59 44.4
 Prob> chi2: 0.032  0  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1  Dummy variables for education indicate deviations from linear impact of years of education on 
log wages. 
2 Reference category for regional variables is Belgrade. 
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Table A2: Heckman wage equation, switching model (informal income)
men women
EQUATION VARIABLES coef se coef se
lny Years of highest education 0.007 (0.015) 0.053*** (0.019)
Tertiaryeducation (4 years)1 -0.007 (0.116) 0.372** (0.164)
Work experience 0.010*** (0.003) 0.006 (0.004)
Vojvodina2 -0.108 (0.085) -0.119* (0.068)
West Serbia2 -0.058 (0.064) -0.093 (0.071)
South-East Serbia2 -0.288*** (0.084) -0.395*** (0.100)
Number of children 0.129*** (0.025) -0.023 (0.035)
Constant 10.200*** (0.224) 9.140*** (0.490)
Select Years of highest education 0.002 (0.013) 0.037*** (0.014)
non-
participation Age -0.013*** (0.003) -0.013*** (0.004)
Number of children below 1 year 0.256 (0.159) -0.867*** (0.283)
Number of children -0.034 (0.036) -0.081 (0.051)
Marital status (2 categories) 0.257*** (0.095) 0.007 (0.129)
Pensions (ad_eq, 000) -0.019*** (0.006) -0.012 (0.008)
Benefits (ad_eq, 000) -0.028* (0.015) -0.014 (0.014)
Constant -0.534*** (0.189) -1.182*** (0.249)
athrho -0.364 (0.232) 0.320 (0.601)
lnsigma -0.818*** (0.075) -1.013*** (0.187)
Observations 1,632 2,202
Censored N 1,380 2,052
rho -0.35 0.31
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): 2.46 0.28
Prob> chi2: 0.12 0.59
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men women
EQUATION VARIABLES coef se coef se
Select Years of highest education -0.139*** (0.016) -0.122*** (0.017)
Formal Age -0.013*** (0.004) -0.012*** (0.005)
Number of children below 1 year 0.086 (0.147) -0.026 (0.305)
Number of children -0.052 (0.045) 0.021 (0.057)
Marital status (2 categories) -0.312*** (0.098) -0.261*** (0.084)
Pensions (ad_eq, 000) -0.013** (0.006) -0.009 (0.005)
Benefits (ad_eq, 000) 0.013 (0.009) -0.000 (0.008)
Constant 1.106*** (0.241) 0.708** (0.287)
athrho -0.280 (0.216) -1.273*** (0.372)
lnsigma -0.837*** (0.093) -0.616*** (0.221)
Observations 2,404 1,980
Censored N 2,152 1,830
rho -0.27 -0.85
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): 1.68 11.7
Prob> chi2: 0.19 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1  Dummy variable for education indicates a deviation from linear impact of years of education on 
log wages. 
2 Reference category for regional variables is Belgrade. 
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